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INTRODUCTION

Targeted strikes-predominantly using drones-have become
the operational counterterrorism tool of choice for the United
States over the past few years. Beginning in the mid-2000s, the
United States has engaged in target-specific drone airstrikes against
Taliban and al Qaeda militants in Pakistan, al Qaeda operatives in
Yemen, and al-Shabab militants in Somalia. In the first such
targeted killing after September 11, a CIA drone launched a
Hellfire missile and killed six suspected al Qaeda members
traveling in a car in southern Yemen in November 2002, including
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the man believed to be responsible for the bombing of the USS
Cole.I U.S. targeted strikes began in Pakistan in 2004, and have
increased dramatically in the past few years. In 2009, the United
States launched fifty-three strikes-a rate of one drone strike per
week-before increasing to 118 strikes in 2010, and had launched
over seventy by November 2011.2 In Somalia, as early as 2007, the
United States launched attacks against al Qaeda members
suspected of involvement in the 1998 Embassy bombings. After
multiple attempts to target Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, the al Qaeda
militant suspected of masterminding the 2002 attack on the
Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, the United States launched a
commando raid in broad daylight, killing Nabhan and at least eight
4
others. Israel has used targeted killing extensively and openly for
over a decade, targeting Hamas militants in Gaza and the West
Bank.
Targeted killing can be defined as "the use of lethal force
attributable to a subject of international law with the intent,
premeditation, and deliberation to kill individually selected
persons who are not in the physical custody of those targeting
them."' Targeted killing can be used both within armed conflict
1. Sources: U.S. Kills Cole Suspect, CNN.coM/WORLD (Nov. 5, 2002),
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/11/04/yemen.blast/index.html;
see also Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, Study on Targeted Killings, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston) [hereinafter Alston
Report], available at http://www.extrajudicialexecutions.org/application/media
/14%20HRC%2OTargeted%2OKillings%2OReport%20%28A.HRC.14.24.Add6%29
.pdf (describing the new targeted killing policies and addressing the main legal
issues that have arisen).
2. Year of the Drone, NEW AM. FOUND. (Apr. 4, 2012), http://counterterrorism
.newamerica.net/drones.
3. US "Targets al-Qaeda" in Somalia, BBC NEWS Uan. 9, 2007),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6245943.stm ("White House spokesman Tony
Snow said the U.S. action was a reminder that there was no safe haven for Islamic
militants. 'This administration continues to go after al-Qaeda."').
4. Jeffrey Gettleman & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Kills Top Qaeda Militant in Southern
Somalia, N.Y.TIMES.COM (Sept. 14, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/15
/world/afr-ica/15raid.html; see also Jeffrey Gettleman & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Forces
Fire Missiles Into Somalia at a Kenyan, N.Y.TIMES.COM (Mar. 4, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/04/world/africa/04somalia.html (detailing an
unsuccessful missile strike aimed at Nabhan launched from Kenya into Somalia).
5. For a discussion of Israel's policy of targeted killings and examples of
several targeted strikes, see Daniel Byman, Do Targeted Killings Work?, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS.COM (Mar./Apr. 2006), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61513
/daniel-byman/do-targeted-killings-work.
6. NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 5 (2008).
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and in the absence of armed conflict, as a means of self-defense,
usually as operational counterterrorism. Indeed, this duality lies at
the heart of the United States' justifications for drone strikes from
Afghanistan to Somalia. Within armed conflict, parties to the
conflict have the right to use lethal force in the first resort against
enemy forces, which includes, as detailed below, members of the
regular armed forces, members of organized armed groups, or
civilians directly participating in hostilities. International law also
recognizes the right of states to use force in self-defense in certain
circumscribed circumstances.
For the past several years, the United States has relied on both
armed conflict and self-defense as legal justifications for targeted
strikes outside of the zone of active combat in Afghanistan. A host
of interesting questions arise from both the use of targeted strikes
and the expansive U.S. justifications for such strikes, including the
use of force in self-defense against non-state actors, the use of force
across state boundaries, the nature and content of state consent to
such operations, the use of targeted killing as a lawful and effective
counterterrorism measure, and others.' Furthermore, each of the
justifications-armed conflict and self-defense-raises its own
challenging questions regarding the appropriate application of the
law and the parameters of the legal paradigm at issue. For
example, if the existence of an armed conflict is the justification for
certain targeted strikes, the immediate follow-on questions include
the determination of a legitimate target within an armed conflict
with a terrorist group and the geography of the battlefield. Within
the self-defense paradigm, key questions include the very contours
of the right to use force in self-defense against individuals and the
7. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. CounterterrorismStrategy
and Law, BROOKINGS (May 11, 2009), http://ww.brookings.edu/papers/2009
/0511= _counterterrorism-anderson.aspx (detailing the recent use of targeted
killings in U.S. counterterrorism strikes, as well as the legal threats to targeted
killing); Chris Jenks, Law from Above: Unmanned Aerial Systems, Use of Force, and the
Law of Armed Conflict, 85 N.D. L. REv. 649 (2009) (assessing the legality of armed
unmanned aircraft systems in Pakistan); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Unlawful Killing
with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009, in SHOOTING To KILL: THE
LAw GOVERNING LETHAL FORCE IN CONTEXT (Simon Bronitt ed. forthcoming);

Jordan

J. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use

of Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 237 (2010) (arguing that self-

defense is permissible against non-state actors who commit armed attacks and that
actions of self-defense can be made in another state without that state's consent);
Michael N. Schmitt, Drone Attacks under theJus ad Bellum andJus in Bello: Clearing
the Tog of Law, '13 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 311 (2010) (assessing drone attacks
underjus ad bellum andjus in bello).
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implementation of the concepts of necessity and imminence,
among many others.
However, equally fundamental questions arise from the use of
both justifications at the same time, without careful distinction
delimiting the boundaries between when one applies and when the
other applies. From the perspective of the policymaker, the use of
both justifications without further distinction surely offers greater
flexibility and potential for action in a range of circumstances. 8 To
the extent such flexibility does not impact the implementation of
the relevant law or hinder the development and enforcement of
that law in the future, it may well be an acceptable goal. In the case
of targeted strikes in the current international environment of
armed conflict and counterterrorism operations occurring at the
same time, however, the mixing of legal justifications raises
significant concerns about both current implementation and future
development of the law.
One overarching concern is the conflation in general ofjus ad
bellum andjus in bello. The former is the law governing the resort
to force-sometimes called the law of self-defense-and the latter is
the law regulating the conduct of hostilities and the protection of
persons in conflict-generally called the law of war, the law of
armed conflict, or international humanitarian law. International
law reinforces a strict separation between the two bodies of law,
ensuring that all parties have the same obligations and rights
during armed conflict to ensure that all persons and property
benefit from the protection of the laws of war. For example, the
Nuremberg Tribunal repeatedly held that Germany's crime of
aggression neither rendered all German acts unlawful nor
prevented German soldiers from benefitting from the protections
of the jus in bello.9 More recently, the Special Court for Sierra
8. See, e.g., Gregory E. Maggs, Assessing the Legality of CounterterrorismMeasures
Without Characterizing Them as Law Enforcement or Military Action, (George Wash. U.
Law Sch. Pub. L. Research, Working Paper No. 257, 2006), available at
("[G]overnments
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=965433
now have a great deal of discretion, after terrorist acts have occurred, to determine
what law will apply to the government's anti-terrorism responses . . . .

If

governments believe that rules governing law enforcement offer them an
advantage, they will treat the matter as a criminal incident. But if they think that
the law pertaining to military force will yield more favorable results, they will label
the terrorists involved as enemy combatants and proceed accordingly.").
9. See, e.g., USA v. Altstotter et at, in LAw REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS,
VOL. VI, UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LONDON 52 (1947-49) ("If we
should adopt the view that by reason of the fact that the war was a criminal war of

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss5/11

4

Blank: Targeted Strikes: The Consequences of Blurring the Armed Conflict

2012]

1659

TARGETED STRIKES

Leone refused to reduce the sentences of Civil Defense Forces
fighters on the grounds that they fought in a "legitimate war" to
protect the government against the rebels.'o The basic principle
that the rights and obligations ofjus in bello apply regardless of the
justness or unjustness of the overall military operation thus remains
firmly entrenched. Indeed, if the cause at arms influenced a state's
obligation to abide by the laws regulating the means and methods
of warfare and requiring protection of civilians and persons hors de
combat, states would justify all departures from jus in bello with
reference to the purported justness of their cause. The result: an
invitation to unregulated warfare."
This article will focus on the consequences of the United
States consistently blurring the lines between the armed conflict
paradigm and the self-defense paradigm as justifications for the use
of force against designated individuals. The first Part sets forth the
basic legal paradigms of armed conflict and self-defense and the
targeting of individuals within each paradigm. In the second Part, I
analyze four primary categories in which the use of both paradigms
without differentiation blurs critical legal rules and principles:
geographical issues surrounding the use of force; the obligation to
capture rather than kill; proportionality; and the identification of
individual targets, namely the conflation of direct participation in
hostilities and imminence. The final Part highlights three areas in
aggression every act which would have been legal in a defensive war was illegal in
this one, we would be forced to the conclusion that every soldier who marched
under orders into occupied territory or who fought in the homeland was a
criminal and a murderer."); USA v. Wilhelm List et al., in TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, VOL. XI 1247-48 (1950) (citing
Oppenheim's InternationalLaw, 1I Lauterpacht, at 174) ("[W]hatever may be the
cause of a war that has broken out, and whether or not the cause be a so-calledjust
cause, the same rules of international law are valid as to what must not be done,
may be done, and must be done by the belligerents themselves in making war
against each other.").

10. Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Judgement, §§
529-30, 534 (May 28, 2008) (noting that the "basic distinction and historical
separation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello [is] a bedrock principle" of the
LOAC and holding that "[a]llowing mitigation for a convicted person's political
motives, even where they are considered .

.

. meritorious .

.

. provides implicit

legitimacy to conduct that unequivocally violates the law-the precise conduct this
Special Court was established to punish.").
11. See, e.g., Geoffrey S. Corn, Self Defense Targeting: Conflict Classification or
Willful Blindness?, in 88 NAVAL WAR C. INT'L L. STUD., at 12 (2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1947838 (highlighting the
dangers of conflating jus ad bellum andjus in bello in the framework of counterterror operations).
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which this blurring of legal justifications and paradigms has
significant contemporary and future consequences for the
application of international law in situations involving the use of
force. In particular, this blurring undermines efforts to fulfill the
core purposes of the law, whether the law of armed conflict or the
law governing the resort to force, hinders the development and
implementation of the law going forward, and risks complicating or
even weakening enforcement of the law.
Over the past two years, we have seen increasing calls for
greater transparency from the U.S. government and intelligence
agencies regarding the decision-making process for targeted
killing, both the placing of individuals on a "kill list" and the actual
decision to operationalize that decision with a targeted strike.
Additional information about the key indicators the United States
views as critical to targeting determinations would certainly provide
greater clarity for legal analysis of any given targeted strike. Much
of the information sought, of course, is classified, making further
detailed analysis difficult and, potentially, unlikely in the near
future. However, the instant analysis offers an alternative approach
both to understanding the effect of the existing United States
framework for targeted strikes and, more importantly, for analyzing
the consequences for implementation and enforcement of the law
overall-now and in the future.
II. THE LEGAL PARADIGMS
In November 2002, a U.S. drone strike killed Abu Ali alHarethi, an al Qaeda operative suspected of masterminding the
October 2000 attack on the USS Cole. The exchange of viewpoints
between the United States and the United Nations Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions set
the stage early on for the dichotomy in approaches to target killing.
After the attack, the U.N. Special Rapporteur asked the U.S.
government to provide justification for the killing of al-Harethi. In

12.

Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, Washington's Phantom War,
AFF. 12 (July/Aug. 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67939
/peter-bergen-and-katherine-tiedemann/washingtons-phantom-war
(arguing for
"[a] more transparent drone-strike program"); Jesse Solomon, New York Times Files
Lawsuit Seeking Info on TargetedKillings, CNN.coM, http://www.cnn.com/2011/12
/21/us/new-york-times-lawsuit/index.html (last updated Dec. 21, 2011, 7:11 PM
EST) (noting a "re-energized . . . national debate over the legal and moral
quandaries of a government deliberately killing one of its own citizens").
FOREIGN
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particular, the Special Rapporteur referred to the drone strike as
an "extrajudicial execution" and framed the event within the
paradigm of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, human rights law overall, and law enforcement principles
for the use of force. The U.S. response clearly showed an entirely
different perspective, stating that "inquiries related to allegations
stemming from any military operations conducted during the
course of an armed conflict with [al Qaeda] do not fall within the
For the United States, the
mandate of the Special Rapporteur."
Special Rapporteur simply did not have jurisdiction to address the
event at all because it took place within an armed conflict between
the United States, al Qaeda, and associated terrorist groups. This
discourse highlights the diver ent approaches to the appropriate
framework for targeted strikes.
Now, almost ten years later, the paradigms are no longer so
clearly delineated but have become blurred through consistent
parallel use. In March 2010, State Department Legal Advisor
Harold Koh stated, in a much-discussed speech before the
American Society of International Law, that the United States uses
force, through targeted strikes for example, either because it "is
engaged in an armed conflict or in legitimate self-defense." 5
Similarly, in a brief before the District Court of the District of
Columbia, the government asserted that it had legal authority to
target Anwar al-Awlaki either in the context of the armed conflict
with al Qaeda and associated forces as authorized in the 2001
Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) or under "the
inherent right to national self-defense recognized in international
law."m The following subsections offer a brief background on
13. SPEcIAL RAPPORTEUR ON EXTRAJUDIcIAL EXECUTIONS, Use of Force During
Armed Conflict, in UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS
HANDBOOK 11 (2010) (quoting the response of the government of the United
States to the letter from the Special Rapporteur, Asmajahangir, to the Secretary of
State dated November 15, 2002), available at http://www.extrajudicialexecutions
.org/application/media/Handbook%20Chapter%201%20Use%20of%20Force%2
ODuring%2OArmed%2OConflicts5.pdf.
14. Note, however, that the exchange in response to the 2002 al-Harethi
strike did not discuss the international law of self-defense, now a major component
of any legal justification for targeted strikes.
15. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Keynote Address
at the Annual Meeting of the American Soc'y of Int'l Law: The Obama
Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010).
16. Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction &
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 4-5, Al-Aulaqi v.
Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No.10-cv-1469(JDB)), 2010 WL
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targeting within these two legal regimes: armed conflict and selfdefense.
A.

The InternationalLaw of Self-Defense

Jus ad bellum is the Latin term for the law governing the resort
to force, that is, when a state may use force within the constraints of
the United Nations Charter framework and traditional legal
principles." Modern jus ad bellum has its origins in the 1919
Covenant of the League of Nations, the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact,
In particular, the United
and the United Nations Charter.
Nations Charter prohibits the use of force by one state against
another in Article 2(4): "All members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations."'
This article, in many ways, is the foundation of the
U.N.'s goal of "sav[ing] succeeding generations from the scourge
of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to
,, 20
mankind, through severe restrictions and prohibitions on the use
of force.
The Charter provides for two exceptions to the prohibition on
the use of force: the multinational use of force authorized by the
Security Council under Chapter VII in Article 42, and the inherent
right of self-defense in response to an armed attack under Article
51. It is the latter that builds on and establishes the basic
framework of the jus ad bellum, stating: "Nothing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security."2 ' The
classic formulation of the parameters of self-defense stems from the
Caroline Incident. British troops crossed the Niagara River to the
3863135.
17. The United Nations Charter prohibits the use of force with two
exceptions: the right to self-defense and the multilateral use of force authorized by
the Security Council under article 42. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (prohibiting the
use of force); id. art. 51 (recognizing the inherent right of self-defense); id art. 42
(providing for the authorization of multilateral use of force).
18. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 780-81 (4th ed. 1997).
19. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
20. U.N. Charter pmbl.
21. U.N. Charter art. 51.
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American side and attacked the steamer Caroline,which had been
running arms and materiel to insurgents on the Canadian side.
The British justified the attack, which killed one American and set
fire to the Caroline, on the grounds that their troops had acted in
self-defense. In a letter to his British counterpart, Lord Ashburton,
U.S. Secretary of State Webster declared that the use of force in
self-defense should be limited to "cases in which the 'necessity of
that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of
means, and no moment for deliberation.' 2 2 Furthermore, the
force used must not be "unreasonable or excessive; since the act,
justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that
Given the extensive
necessity, and kept clearly within it."2
literature analyzing the right of self-defense and, in particular, the
parameters of the right of self-defense in response to terrorist
attacks, 4 this article will provide simply a brief synopsis of the
fundamental issues and elements of the framework.
Nothing in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter specifies that the
right of self-defense is only available in response to a threat or use
of force by another state. Nonetheless, the precise contours of
which type of actor can trigger the right of self-defense remains
controversial. Some argue that only states can be the source of an
armed attack-or imminent threat of an armed attack-to justify
25
the use of force in self-defense. The International Court ofJustice
22. Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec'y of State, to Lord Ashburton,
Special British Minister (Aug. 6, 1842), in 2 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 217, at 412 (1906).
23. Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec'y of State, to Henry Fox, British
Minister in Washington (Apr. 24, 1841), in 29 BRITISH & FOREIGN STATES PAPERS
1840-1841, 1138 (1857).
24. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 175-82 (2d
ed. 1994) (discussing the concept of and the right of self-defense); David
Kretzmer, Taigeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists:Extra-JudicialExecutions or Legitimate
Means of Defence?, 16 EUR.J. INT'L L. 171, 173 (2005) (noting that some states argue

that targeted killings are within the "state's inherent right to self-defence"); Craig
Martin, Going Medieval: Targeted Killing, Self-Defence, and the Jus ad Bellum Regime, in
KILLINGS: LAW & MORALITY IN AN AS1YmMETRICAL WORLD (Claire
Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin, Andrew Altman eds., forthcoming) (discussing the
validity of a self-defense claim regarding targeted killing of suspected terrorists);
Paust, supra note 7, at 238 ("Self-Defense Is Permissible Against Armed Attacks by
TARGETED

Non-State Actors."); Michael N. Schmitt, Responding to Transnational Terrorism
Under theJus Ad Bellum: A Normative Framework, 56 NAVAL. L. REv. 1 (2008) ("[The]

United States
terrorism.").
25.

claim[ed]

self-defense

as a

right in forcefully countering

See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, The InternationalCommunity's 'Legal' Response to
INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 589, 597 (1989) (discussing the criticisms of the

Terrorism, 38
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has continued to limit the right in this manner in a series of cases.
However, state practice in the aftermath of 9/11 provides firm
support for the existence of a right of self-defense against non-state
27
Indeed, the Caroline
actors, even if unrelated to any state.
incident, which forms the historical foundation of the right to selfdefense, involved an armed attack by non-state actors. United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1368, for example, recognized
the inherent right of self-defense against the September 11 attacks
and "[u]nequivocally condemn[ed] in the strongest terms the
horrifying terrorist attacks which took place on 11 September 2001
in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania and regard[ed]
such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to
international peace and security."" Similarly, the North Atlantic
Council issued a statement activating the collective self-defense
provision in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as did the
Organization of American States regarding its constituent treaty.
legal response to terrorism); Eric Myjer & Nigel White, The Twin Towers Attack: An
Unlimited Right to Self-Defense, 7J. CONFLIct & SECURIlY L. 5, 7 (2002) ("Self-defense,
traditionally speaking, applies to an armed response to an attack by a state.").
26. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 1.C.J. 14
(June 27); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 42 I.L.M. 1334 (Nov. 6); Armed Activities
on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168
(Dec. 19); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 215 (July 9).
27. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 214; Christopher Greenwood,
International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, al Qaeda, and Iraq, 4
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 7, 17 (2003) (discussing the effects of attacks made by nonstate actors); Sean D. Murphy, The InternationalLegality of US Military Cross-Border
Operations, 85 INT'L L. STUD. 109, 126 ("While this area of the law remains

somewhat uncertain, the dominant trend in contemporary interstate relations
seems to favor the view that States accept or at least tolerate acts of self-defense
against a non-State actor."); Raphael Van Steenberghe, Self-Defence in Response to
Attacks by Non-state Actors in the Light of Recent State Practice: A Step Forward?, 23

L. 183, 184 (2010) (concluding that recent state practice suggests
that attacks committed by non-state actors alone constitute armed attacks under
article 51).
28. S.C. Res. 1368, 1 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001) (emphasis
added).
29. North Atlantic Treaty, art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S.
243, 246; Press Release, NATO, Statement by the North Atlantic Council (Sept. 12,
2001); Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, art. 3.1, Sept. 2, 1947, 62
Stat. 1681, 1700, 21 U.N.T.S. 77, 93; Terrorist Threat to the Americas, Res. 1,
Twenty-fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Terrorist
Threat to the Americas, OAS Doc. RC.24/RES.1/01 (Sept. 21, 2001). Similarly,
Australia activated the collective self-defense provision of the ANZUS Pact.
Security Treaty, U.S.-Aust.-N.Z., art. IV, Sept. 1, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3420, 3423, 131
U.N.T.S. 83, 86; Brendan Pearson, PM Commits to Mutual Defence, AUSTL. FIN. REV.,
LEIDENJ. INT'L
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Several other states have asserted the same right, including Turkey,
Israel, Colombia, and Russia, for example. 0
One additional component to the use of force in self-defense
against a non-state actor is that the state using force will be doing so
in the territory of another state, one that did not launch the
original attack. It must therefore either act with the consent of the
territorial state or on the grounds that the territorial state is
unwilling or unable to take action to remove the threat posed by
the non-state actor and to repel future attacks." The overall debate
has substantial consequences for the legality of the use of force as
part of counterterrorism operations outside of an armed conflict.
For the purposes of the instant analysis, most relevant are the
parameters of the self-defense paradigm with regard to the
identification of targets and authorization of the use of force.
Under Article 51 and the historical right of self-defense, a state can
use force in self-defense in response to an armed attack as long as
the force used is necessary and proportionate to the goal of
repelling the attack or ending the grievance. 2 Thus, the law
focuses on whether the defensive act is appropriate in relation to
the ends sought. The requirement of proportionality in jus ad
bellum measures the extent of the use of force against the overall
military goals, such as fending off an attack or subordinating the
enemy. The requirement of necessity addresses whether there are
adequate non-forceful options to deter or defeat the attack. To this
end, "acts done in self-defense must not exceed in manner or aim
the necessity provoking them."3 ' A third criterion is immediacy,
which addresses the temporal constraints on the use of force either
before or in response to an armed attack.
With regard to targeted strikes against individuals, necessity
plays out in perhaps greater detail than with regard to state action
Sept. 15, 2001, at 9.
30. For an extensive treatment and discussion of the use of force in selfdefense and the unwilling or unable test with regard to state consent to the use of
force, see Ashley S. Deeks, "Unwilling or Unable": Toward a Normative Framework for
ExtraterritorialSelfDefense, 52 VA.J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2012).
31. See generally id. (examining in depth the "unwilling or unable" test).
32. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, 246 (July 8); Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27); Jus Ad Bellum, (Ethiopia v. Eritrea), Ethiopia's Claims 1-8,
Partial Award (Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission 2005), http://www.pcacpa.org/upload/files/FINAL%20ET%20JAB.pdf.
33. Oscar Schachter, In Defense of InternationalRules on the Use of Force, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 113, 132 (1986).
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to repel an attack by another state. In most cases, targeted strikes
are used to neutralize a non-state actor who poses a threat to the
security of the responding state-by planning, and potentially
launching, a terrorist attack against the state, the state's interests,
or the state's nationals. Effective counterterrorism seeks to prevent
such attacks, not only to identify and attack those responsible after
the fact. In this framework, there are two main components to the
necessity prong of the self-defense paradigm-imminence and
alternatives. First, the threat posed by the non-state actor must be
imminent.
An imminent threat in the terrorism paradigm is just
that-a clear and present danger-that unless mitigated
endangers innocent civilians. It is not an amorphous
threat, distant in time; quite the opposite for it indicates
that unless specific measures are taken with respect to the
person posing the threat harm will befall those not in a
34
position to protect themselves.
In effect, targeting an individual requires two levels of
necessity analysis. The first layer is whether targeting him or her is
"necessary in the sense that [the "host" state] is unable or unwilling
to act effectively to suppress the threat he poses," and the second
examines whether "targeting him would advance the goal of
preventing further attacks."35 One detailed framework for assessing
imminence with regard to terrorist threats is as follows, for
example:
(1) the intent of the terrorist group and the probability of
attack (have they made clear their determination to attack
and is there reliable intelligence to suggest they are
planning to attack?); (2) capacity (what is their capacity to
attack .. . ?); (3) methods of attack (terrorists use
deception and stealth and there will likely be no advance
warning; thus waiting until an attack is underway will be
too late for effective self-defense); (4) gravity of likely
harm (given what is known about the terrorists' intent and
capacity, what is the likely harm expected from an
attack?); and (5) urgency of the threat (is there good

34. Amos N. Guiora, Targeted Killing-A Proposalfor Criteria-BasedDecisionMaking, in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAw & MORALITY IN AN SYMMETRICAL WORLD (Claire
Finkelstein et al. eds., forthcoming 2012).
35. Robert Chesney, Who May Be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the
InternationalLegal Regulation of Lethal Force, in 13 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 3, 27

(M.N. Schmitt et al. eds., 2010).
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reason to believe that the likelihood of attack is
increasing, and that acting now is critical to thwarting an
attack?).
Second, there must be no alternatives to the use of force as a
means to deter or repel the threat posed by such individual. If the
state has the option or ability to detain the individual (or seek his
arrest by the territorial state's authorities) or otherwise thwart the
attack, then the necessity prong will not be satisfied. Thus, as many
scholars posit, "the targeting of suspected terrorists must be
restricted to cases in which there is credible evidence that the
targeted persons are actively involved in planning or preparing
further terrorist attacks against the victim state and no other
operational means of stopping those attacks are available.",1
To this point, this discussion has centered on the law
governing the resort to force-in the context of targeted strikes,
the legal regime that governs a state's use of force against a nonstate actor in another state's territory. Another facet of the inquiry
involves the appropriate legal parameters of the use of force against
the individual himself or herself. In circumstances where the
targeted strike takes place within the context of an armed conflict,
the law of armed conflict will determine the legality of any lethal
targeting, as discussed below. However, in many cases in which a
state uses force against a non-state actor outside its own territory, it
will be in the context of counterterrorism as self-defense, outside of
any armed conflict.
In the absence of an armed conflict,
international human rights law and the principles governing the
use of force in law enforcement will govern. Article 6 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that
"[e]very human being has the inherent right to life. This right
shall be rotected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
his life."
In a slightly different formulation, the European
36.

Jane E. Stromseth, New Paradigmsfor the jus Ad Bellum, 38 GEO. WASH.
REv. 561, 568 (2006).
37. Kretzmer, supra note 24, at 203; see also Schmitt, supra note 24, at 15 ("If
law-enforcement measures (or other measures short of self-defense) will assuredly
foil a terrorist attack on their own, forceful measures in self-defense may not be
taken. The issue is not whether law enforcement officials are likely to bring the
terrorists to justice, but instead whether, with a reasonable degree of certainty, law
enforcement actions alone will protect the target(s) of the terrorism. For instance,
if members of a terrorist cell can confidently be arrested, that action must be
taken in lieu of a military attack designed to kill its members.").
38. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, art. 6, (Dec. 16, 1966).
INT'L L.
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Convention on the Protection of Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms establishes the right to life and states that any
"[d]eprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in
contravention of this article when it results from the use of force
which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any
person from unlawful violence. . . ."'

Here the use of lethal force

is-appropriately-tightly prescribed and extraordinarily restricted.
Under [international human rights law,] the intentional
use of lethal force by state authorities can be justified only
in strictly limited conditions. The state is obliged to
respect and ensure the rights of every person to life and to
due process of law. Any intentional use of lethal force by
state authorities that is not justified under the provisions
regarding the right to life, will, by definition, be regarded
as an 'extra-judicial execution. 4 0
The use of lethal force against suspected terrorists outside of
armed conflict can therefore only be used when absolutely
necessary to protect potential victims of terrorist acts. However, the
understanding of precisely what constitutes a situation of "absolute
necessity" remains quite broad, such that there can be varied
interpretations of when a targeted strike is lawful outside the
context of an armed conflict.' Indeed, some scholars have posited
recently that there is, in essence, an additional paradigm called
"self-defense targeting," which holds that the jus ad bellum right of
self-defense creates sufficient and exclusive authority for the use of
military force to target a threat without relying on either the law of
armed conflict (LOAC) or human rights law for regulating
For the purposes of this article and this brief
authority.42
39. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 2(2), opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered
into force Sept. 3, 1953).
40. Kretzmer, supra note 24, at 176; see also Basic Principles on the Use of
Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, Eighth United Nations
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, G.A. Res.
45/166, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1, at 112 (Dec. 18, 1990) (stating that
force can only be used "in self-defence or defence of others against the imminent
threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the perpetration of a particularly
serious crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person presenting such a
danger and resisting their authority, or to prevent his or her escape, and only
when the less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these objectives").
41. See, e.g., Alston Report, supra note 1; Kretzmer, supra note 24, at 173; Paust,
supra note 7; Schmitt, supra note 24.
42. See Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing and Drone Warfare: How We Came to
Debate Whether There is a 'Legal Geography of War,' in FUTURE CHALLENGES IN
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background, however, what is essential is the distinction between
the basic framework for the legality of targeting in self-defense
outside of armed conflict and the legality of targeting within the
context of an armed conflict, and that such a distinction exists and
continues to have great value.
B.

Targeting in Armed Conflict

The LOAC-otherwise known as the law of war or
international humanitarian law-governs the conduct of both
states and individuals during armed conflict and seeks to minimize
suffering in war by protecting persons not participating in
hostilities and by restricting the means and methods of warfare.
The LOAC applies during all situations of armed conflict, with the
full panoply of the Geneva Conventions and customary law
applicable in international armed conflict and a more limited body
of conventional and customary law applicable during noninternational armed conflict.
The lawfulness of targeting
individuals and objects during armed conflict is determined by the
principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions. Again,
as in the previous section detailing the parameters of the use of
force in self-defense, this section will offer a brief background on
these key components of the law of targeting.
(Peter Berkowitz ed. 2010); Corn, supra note 11
(describing the theory of self-defense targeting and arguing that it poses
significant dangers in conflating the LOAC and the law of self-defense); Paust,
supranote 7.
43. See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAw? (2004), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/legalfact-sheet/humanitarian-law-factsheet.htm. The law of armed conflict is codified
primarily in the four Geneva Conventions of August 14, 1949 and their Additional
Protocols. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC Il]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted by ConferenceJune 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol II), adopted by Conference June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter AP Il].
NATIONAL SECURITY AND LAW
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One of the most fundamental issues during conflict is
The principle of
identifying who or what can be targeted.
distinction, one of the "cardinal principles" of the LOAC," requires
that any party to a conflict distinguish between those who are
fighting and those who are not and to direct attacks solely at the
former. Similarly, parties must distinguish between civilian objects
and military objects and target only the latter. Article 48 of
Additional Protocol I thus sets forth the basic rule: "In order to
ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and
between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly
shall direct their operations only against military objectives."4 5
Distinction lies at the core of the LOAC's seminal goal of
protecting innocent civilians and persons who are hors de combat.
The obligation to distinguish is part of the customary international
law of both international and non-international armed conflicts, as
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
("ICTY") held in the Tadic case. The purpose of distinction-to
protect civilians-is emphasized in Article 51 of Additional
Protocol I, which states that "[t]he civilian population as such, as

44. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
78 (July 8) (Higgins, J., dissenting on unrelated grounds)
1996 I.C.J. 226,
(declaring that distinction and the prohibition on unnecessary suffering are the
two cardinal principles of international humanitarian law).
45. AP I, supra note 43, at art. 48. Article 48 is considered customary
See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 1
international law.
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONALHUMANITARIAN LAw 3-8 (2005) [hereinafter CIHL].
46. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on Defence Motion for
110 (Oct. 2, 1995) ("Bearing in mind the
Interlocutory Appeal on jurisdiction,
need for measures to ensure the better protection of human rights in armed
conflicts of all types, [. . . the General Assembly] Affirms the following basic
principles for the protection of civilian populations in armed conflicts, without
prejudice to their future elaboration within the framework of progressive
development of the international law of armed conflict: . . . [i]n the conduct of
military operations during armed conflicts, a distinction must be made at all times
between persons actively taking part in the hostilities and civilian populations."
(quoting G.A. Res. 2675, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(Dec. 9, 1970))); see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
79 (July 8) (distinction is one of the
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
"intransgressible principles of international customary law"); CIHL, supranote 45,
at 3-8 (discussing the distinction between civilians and combatants); Abella v.
Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95,
doc. 7 rev. 11 177-178 (1997) (consisting of a dispute over the treatment by
Argentine officials of armed attackers who surrendered).
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well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.",1
Furthermore, Article 85 of Protocol I declares that nearly all
violations of distinction constitute grave breaches of the Protocol,
and the Rome Statute similarly criminalizes attacks on civilians and
indiscriminate attacks.
Distinction thus requires identification of lawful targets as a
prerequisite to the use of force in armed conflict. A lawful attack
must be directed at a legitimate target: either a combatant,
member of an organized armed group, a civilian directly
participating in hostilities, or a military objective. In international
armed conflicts-those occurring between states-all members of
the state's regular armed forces are combatants and can be
identified by the uniform they wear, among other characteristics.
Other persons falling within the category of combatant include
members of volunteer militia who meet four requirements: wearing
a distinctive emblem, carrying arms openly, operating under
responsible command, and abiding by the law of armed conflict.
Members of the regular armed forces of a government not
recognized by the opposing party and civilians participating in a
levee en masse also qualify as combatants in international armed
conflict.5 Combatants can be attacked at all times and enjoy no
immunity from attack, except when they are hors de combat due to
sickness, wounds, or capture. In non-international armed conflicts,
including state versus non-state actor conflicts, there is no
combatant status, but individuals who are members of an organized
armed group are legitimate targets of attack at all times.52
47. AP I, supranote 43, at art. 51(2).
48. AP I, supranote 43, at art. 85.
49. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998), at arts. 8(2)(b)(i), 8(2)(b)(ii), 8(2)(b)(iv),
8(2)(b)(v), 8(2)(b)(vi), 8(2)(e)(i), 8(2)(e)(ii), 8(2)(e)(iv), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/english/rome-statute (e).pdf.
50. GC III, supra note 43, at art. 4(A) (2).
51. Id. at arts. 4(A) (3), 4(A) (6).
52. SeeJIMMY GURULE & GEOFFREY S. CORN, PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER-TERRORISM
LAw 70-76 (2011) (discussing the rules governing targeting of enemy forces in
international and non-international armed conflict and noting that (1) "a member
of an enemy force . . . is presumed hostile and therefore presumptively subject to
attack" in international armed conflict and (2) "subjecting members of organized
belligerent groups to status based targeting pursuant to the LOAC as opposed to
civilians who periodically lose their protection from attack seems both logical and
consistent with the practice of states engaged in non-international armed
conflicts"); Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in
Hostilities under InternationalHumanitarian Law, 90 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 872, 995
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Finally, civilians who take direct participation in hostilities are
also legitimate targets of attack during and for such time as they
engage directly in hostilities.
In certain limited circumstances,
therefore, civilians may be directly and intentionally targeted
during hostilities.
Thus, "[t]he principle of distinction
acknowledges the military necessity prong of [the law's] balancing
act by suspending the protection to which civilians are entitled
when they become intricately involved in a conflict.", 4 In recent
years, courts and commentators have struggled to define the
concept of direct participation in hostilities and develop
parameters for understanding when civilians-as the term is
traditionally used-become legitimate targets by dint of such
participation . A detailed analysis of direct participation is outside
the scope of this article; for the purposes of the instant discussion,
it is sufficient to define direct participation in hostilities as acts
intended to harm the enemy or the civilian population in a direct
or immediate manner, therefore making the actor a legitimate
target of attack for the purposes of distinction within the law of
at
Guidance],
available
[hereinafter
Interpretive
(2008)
http://www.cicr.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-872-reports-documents.pdf
(stating that organized armed groups are targetable based on status in noninternational armed conflict).
53. AP I, supra note 43, at art. 51(3).
54. Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct
Participationin Hostilities:A CriticalAnalysis, I HARv. NAT'L SECURIlYJ. 5, 12 (2010).
55. See, e.g., HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov't of
Israel 26 [2005] (Isr.); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment,
1 616 (July 15, 1999). See generally CIHL, supra note 45 at 2-9 (discussing the
distinction between civilians and combatants); Jason Callen, Unlawful Combatants
and the Geneva Conventions, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 1025 (2004) (discussing unlawful
combatants); Derek Jinks, The Changing Laws of War: Do We Need a New Legal Regime
after September ]l?: Protective Parity and the Laws of War, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1493,
1495-1501 (2004) (discussing the legal situation of unlawful combatants); Jann K
Kleffner, From "Belligerents" to "Fighters" and Civilians Directly Participating in
Hostilities-On The Principle of Distinction in Non-International Armed Conflicts One
Hundred Years After the Second Hague Peace Conference, 54 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 315
(2007) (discussing the status of the definition of "belligerents" in the modern
world); Melzer, Interpretive Guidance, supra note 52 (stating that organized armed
groups are targetable based on status in non-international armed conflict); W.
Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REv. 1 (1990) (discussing the law
of war with regard to aerial bombardment); Michael N. Schmitt, HumanitarianLaw
and Direct Participationin Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian Employees, 5 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 519, 522-36 (2005) (discussing civilian participation in war to the extent
that the civilians become lawful targets); K.W. Watkin, Combatants, Unprivileged
Belligerents and Conflict in the 21" Century, 1 ISR. DEF. FORCEs L. REv. 69 (2003)
(discussing the capacity of international humanitarian law to adequately address
conflict in its modern form).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss5/11

18

Blank: Targeted Strikes: The Consequences of Blurring the Armed Conflict

TARGETED STRIKES

2012]

1673

armed conflict.
The second key principle, the principle of proportionality,
requires that parties refrain from attacks in which the expected
civilian casualties will be excessive in relation to the anticipated
This principle balances military
military advantage gained.
necessity and humanity, and is based on the confluence of two key
ideas. First, the means and methods of attacking the enemy are not
unlimited. Rather, the only legitimate object of war is to weaken
the military forces of the enemy. Second, the legal proscription on
targeting civilians does not extend to a complete prohibition on all
civilian deaths. The law has always tolerated "[t]he incidence of
some civilian casualties .. . as a consequence of military action, 56
although "even a legitimate target may not be attacked if the
collateral civilian casualties would be disproportionate to the
specific military gain from the attack.",5 That is, the law requires
that military commanders and decision makers assess the advantage
to be gained from an attack and assess it in light of the likely
.
.
58
civilian casualties.
Additional Protocol I contains three separate statements of the
principle of proportionality. The first appears in Article 51, which
sets forth the basic parameters of the obligation to protect civilians
and the civilian population, and prohibits any "attack which may be
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated." 9
This language demonstrates that
Additional Protocol I contemplates incidental civilian casualties,
and appears again in Articles 57(2)(a)(iii) " and 57(2)(b), " which
56.
Bello,

Judith Gardham, Necessity and Proportionality inJus Ad Bellum and jus In

in INTERNATIONAL LAw, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OFJUSTICE AND NUCLEAR
WEAPONS 283-84 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds., 1999).

57. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, 587 (July 8) (dissenting opinion ofJudge Higgins).
58. The term "collateral damage" is often used in the media and by the
public to refer to the incidental (meaning not deliberate) civilian casualties from
an attack on a military target.
59. AP 1, supra note 43, at art. 51(5) (b).
60. Id. art. 57(2) (a) (iii) ("With respect to attacks, the following precautions
shall be taken: [t] hose who plan or decide upon an attack shall: . . . [r]efrain from

deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated . . . .").

61.

Id. art. 57(2) (b) ("An attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes
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refer specifically to precautions in attack. Proportionality is not a
mathematical concept, but rather a guideline to help ensure that
military commanders weigh the consequences of a particular attack
and refrain from launching attacks that will cause excessive civilian
deaths. The principle of proportionality is well-accepted as an
element of customary international law applicable in all armed
conflicts.62
Lastly, the LOAC mandates that all parties take certain
precautionary measures to protect civilians. In many ways, the
identification of military objectives and the proportionality
considerations are, of course, precautions. But the obligations of
the parties to a conflict to take precautionary measures go beyond
that. Beginning at the broadest level, Article 57(1) of Additional
Protocol I states: "In the conduct of military operations, constant
care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and
civilian objects."6 ' This provision is a direct outgrowth of and
supplement to the Basic Rule in Article 48, which mandates that all
parties distinguish between combatants and civilians and between
military objects and civilian objects. The practical provisions
forming the major portion of Article 57 discuss precautions to be
taken specifically when launching an attack. Precautions are,
understandably, a critical component of the law's efforts to protect
civilians and are of particular importance in densely populated
areas or areas where civilians are at risk from the consequences of
military operations. For this reason, even if a target is legitimate
under the laws of war, failure to take precautions can make an
attack on that target unlawful.
First, parties must do everything feasible to ensure that targets
are military objectives. Doing so helps to protect civilians by
apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection
or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated ...
62. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, 587 (July 8); CIHL, supra note 45, at 46; Michael N. Schmitt, Fault
Lines in the Law of Attack, in TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAw 277, 292 (Susan Breau & AgnieszkaJachec-Neale eds., 2006);
Yorarn Dinstein, The Laws of Air, Missile and Nuclear Warfare, 27 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs.
1, 7 (1997) (citing Christopher Greenwood, Customary International Law and the
First Geneva Protocol of 1977 in the Gulf Conflict, in THE GULF WAR 1990-91 IN
INTERNATIONAL AND ENGLISH LAw 63, 77 (P. Rowe ed., Sweet & Maxwell 1993)).
63. AP I, supra note 43, art. 57(1).
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limiting attacks to military targets, thus directly implementing the
principle of distinction. Second, they must choose the means and
methods of attack with the aim of minimizing incidental civilian
losses and damage. For example, during the 1991 Persian Gulf
War, "pilots were advised to attack bridges in urban areas along a
longitudinal axis. This measure was taken so that bombs that
missed their targets-because they were dropped either too early
or too late-would hopefully fall in the river and not on civilian
housing."6 Another common method of taking precautions is to
launch attacks on particular targets at night when the civilian
population is not on the streets or at work, thus minimizing
potential losses. In addition, when choosing between two possible
attacks offering similar military advantage, parties must choose the
objective that offers the least likely harm to civilians and civilian
objects. Each of these steps requires an attacking party to take
affirmative action to preserve civilian immunity and minimize
'C5
civilian casualties and damage-in effect, to take "constant care.
Proportionality considerations are also a major component of the
precautions framework. Parties are required to refrain from any
attacks that would be disproportionate and to cancel any attacks
where it becomes evident that the civilian losses would be excessive
in light of the military advantage. Finally, Article 57(2) (c) of
Additional Protocol I requires attacking parties to issue an effective
advance warning "of attacks which may affect the civilian
population, unless circumstances do not permit."
As noted in the introduction to this article, maintaining the
separation between and independence of jus ad bellum and jus in
bello is vital for the effective application of the law and protection
of persons in conflict. The discussion that follows will refer to both
the LOAC and the law of self-defense extensively in a range of
situations in order to analyze and highlight the risks of blurring the
lines between the two paradigms. However, it is important to note
that the purpose here is not to conflate the two paradigms, but to
emphasize the risks inherent in blurring these lines. Preserving the
historic separation remains central to the application of both

64. Jean-Francois Queguiner, Precautions Under the Law Governing the Conduct
of Hostilities, 88 INT'L REV. RED CROss 793, 801 (2006) (citing Michael W. Lewis, The
Law of Aerial Bombardment in the 1991 Gulf War, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 481 (2003))

(noting that this angle of attack "also means that damage would tend to be in the
middle of the bridge and thus easier to repair").
65. SeeAP I, supra note 43, at art. 57(1).
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bodies of law, to the maintenance of international security, and to
the regulation of the conduct of hostilities.
III. BLURRING THE LINES
The nature of the terrorist threat the United States and other
states face does indeed raise the possibility that both the armed
conflict and the self-defense paradigms are relevant to the use of
targeted strikes overall. The United States has maintained for the
past ten years that it is engaged in an armed conflict with al
Qaeda'6 and, notwithstanding continued resistance to the notion of
an armed conflict between a state and a transnational terrorist
group in certain quarters, there is general acceptance that the
scope of armed conflict can indeed encompass such a state versus
non-state conflict. Not all U.S. counterterrorism measures fit
within the confines of this armed conflict, however, with the result
that many of the U.S. targeted strikes over the past several years
may well fit more appropriately within the self-defense paradigm.
The existence of both paradigms as relevant to targeted strikes is
not inherently problematic. It is the United States' insistence on
using reference to both paradigms as justification for individual
attacks and the broader program of targeted strikes that raises
significant concerns for the use of international law and the
protection of individuals by blurring the lines between the key
parameters of the two paradigms.

66. All three branches of the U.S. government have demonstrated that they
view the situation as an armed conflict. See Authorization to Use Military Force
("AUMF"), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224(a) (2001); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557 (2006); Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001) (stating that the 9/11
attacks "created a state of armed conflict that requires the use of the United States
Armed Forces"); Dept of Def. Military Commission Order No. 1, Procedures for
Trials by Military Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism (Mar. 21, 2002); see also Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, Dept. of
State, The Obama Administration and International Law, Keynote Address at the
Annual Meeting of the American Soc'y of Int'l Law (Mar. 25, 2010) (stating that
the United States is "in an armed conflict with Al Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and
associated forces"); Reply of the Government of the United States of America to
the Report of the Five UNHCR Special Rapporteurs on Detainees in Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba 4 (2006), available at http://www.asil.org/pdfs/ilib0603212.pdf ("[T]he
United States is engaged in a continuing armed conflict against Al Qaeda, the
Taliban and other terrorist organizations supporting them, with troops on the
ground in several places engaged in combat operations.").
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Location of Attacks: InternationalLaw and the Scope of the Battlefield

The distinct differences between the targeting regimes in
armed conflict and in self-defense and who can be targeted in
which circumstances makes understanding the differentiation
between the two paradigms essential to lawful conduct in both
situations. The United States has launched targeted strikes in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Syria during the past
several years. The broad geographic range of the strike locations
has produced significant questions-as yet mostly unansweredand debate regarding the parameters of the conflict with al
Qaeda.6 7 The U.S. armed conflict with al Qaeda and other terrorist
groups has focused on Afghanistan and the border regions of
Pakistan, but the United States has launched an extensive
campaign of targeted strikes in Yemen and some strikes in Somalia
in the past year as well. In the early days of the conflict, the United
States seemed to trumpet the notion of a global battlefield, in
which the conflict with al Qaeda extended to every corner of the
68
world.
Others have argued that conflict, even one with a
transnational terrorist group, can only take place in limited,
defined geographic areas.69 At present, the United States has
67. Laurie R. Blank, Defining the Battlefield in Contemporary Conflict and
Counterterrorism:Understandingthe Parametersof the Zone of Combat, 39 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1 (2010).
68. For example, President Bush announced that "[o]ur war on terror will be
much broader than the battlefields and beachheads of the past. The war will be
fought wherever terrorists hide, or run, or plan." Kenneth Roth, The Law of War in
the War on Terror, FOREIGN AFF., Jan-Feb 2004; see, e.g., Eric Schmitt & Mark
Mazzetti, Classified Order Allows U.S. to Attack al Qaeda Worldwide, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Nov. 10, 2008 (describing a secret order signed by then-Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld giving the U.S. military authority to strike at al Qaeda targets
anywhere in the world); Matthew C. Waxman, The Structure of Terrorism Threats and
the Laws of War, 20 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 429, 444 (2010) (citing Anthony
Dworkin, Beyond the War on Terror: Towards a New Transatlantic Framework for
Counterterrorism,13 EUR. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. 5 (2009)) (noting that this view
"'extend [s] the boundaries of the conflict to take in al-Qaeda's operations around
the world"'); Interview with Condoleeza Rice (Fox News Sunday, Nov. 11, 2002),
available at http://www.foxnews.com/printer-friendly-story/0,3566,69783,00.html
(Secretary of State Rice explained that "we are in a new kind of war. And we've
made very clear that it is important that this new kind of war be fought on
different battlefields").
69. Rise of the Drones H: Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targeting: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Nat ' Sec. and Foreign Affairs, H. Comm. on Oversight and Govt.
Reform, 111th Cong. 2-5 (2010) (statement of Mary Ellen O'Connell); see also Rise
of the Drones II: Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targeting: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Nat '1 Sec. and Foreign Affairs, H. Comm. on Oversight and Govt. Reform,
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stepped back from the notion of a global battlefield, although
there is little guidance to determine precisely what factors
influence the parameters of the zone of combat in the conflict with
701
al Qaeda.
Traditionally, the law of neutrality provided the guiding
framework for the parameters of the battlespace in an international
armed conflict. When two or more states are fighting and certain
other states remain neutral, the line between the two forms the
divider between the application of the laws of war and the law of
71'
The law of neutrality is based on the ftndamental
neutrality.
principle that neutral territory is inviolable and focuses on three
111th Cong. (2010) (submission of Michael W. Lewis) (discussing the argument
for a limited geographical scope to the battlefield in the conflict with al Qaeda).
70. In 2006, then State Department Legal Adviser John Bellinger stated in a
speech at the London School of Economics:
I am not suggesting that, because we remain in a state of armed conflict
with al Qaida, the United States is free to use military force against al
Qaida in any state where an al Qaida terrorist may seek shelter. The U.S.
military does not plan to shoot terrorists on the streets of London. As a
practical matter, though, a state must be responsible for preventing
terrorists from using its territory as a base for launching attacks. And, as
a legal matter, where a state is unwilling or unable to do so, it may be
lawful for the targeted state to use military force in self-defense to address
that threat.
John B. Bellinger, III, Legal Issues in the War on Terrorism, Public Lecture at the
London School of Economics (October 31, 2006), http://www2.lse.ac.uk
/publicEvents/pdf/20061031John Bellinger.pdf. As the quote suggests, there are
geographical parameters of some sort guiding the U.S. determinations to use
force; however, it is not clear what those parameters are or what factors drive the
determinations.
71. DINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 25-26 ("The laws of neutrality are operative
only as long as the neutral State retains its neutral status. Once that State becomes
immersed in the hostilities, the laws of neutrality cease being applicable, and the
laws of warfare take their place. However, if the neutral State is not drawn into the
war, the laws of neutrality are activated from the onset of the war until its
conclusion.").
72. Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, T.S. No.
540, art. I [hereinafter Hague V]; see also GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAw AMONG
NATIONS 844 (Bruce Nichols ed., 6th rev. ed. 1992) ("The basic right beyond any
question is the inviolability of neutral territory . . . and . . . all other neutral rights

really are mere corollaries to that fundamental principle."); MORRIs GREENSPAN,
(1959) ("The chief and most vital right of
a neutral state is that of the inviolability of its territory."); GEORG
SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 177 (6th ed. 1976)
(explaining that the rights and duties of neutral powers tinder international
customary law can be summarized in three basic rules: "(1) A neutral State must
abstain from taking sides in the war and from assisting either belligerent. (2) A
neutral State has the right and duty to prevent its territory from being used by

THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 534
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main goals: (1) contain the spread of hostilities, particularly by
keeping down the number of participants; (2) define the legal
rights of parties and nonparties to the conflict; and (3) limit the
impact of war on nonparticipants, especially with regard to
commerce.73 In this way, neutrality law leads to a geographic-based
framework in which belligerents can fight on belligerent territory
or the commons, but must refrain from any operations on neutral
territory. In essence, the battlespace in a traditional armed conflict
between two or more states is anywhere outside the sovereign
territory of any of the neutral states.' 4 The language of the Geneva
Conventions tracks this concept fairly closely. Common Article 2,
which sets forth the definition of international armed conflict,
states that such conflict occurs in "all cases of declared war or ...
any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of
the High Contracting Parties."'
In Common Article 3, noninternational armed conflicts include conflicts between a state and
non-state armed groups that are "occurring in the territory of one
of the High Contracting Parties.
Both of these formulations tie
the location of the armed conflict directly to the territory of one or
more belligerent parties.
The neutrality framework as a geographic parameter is left
wanting in today's conflicts with terrorist groups, however. First, as
a formal matter, the law of neutrality technically only applies in
cases of international armed conflict.
Even analogizing to the
situations we face today is highly problematic, however, because
today's conflicts not only pit states against non-state actors, but
because those actors and groups often do not have any territorial
nexus beyond wherever they can find safe haven from government
either belligerent as a base for hostile operations. (3) A neutral State must
acquiesce in certain restrictions which belligerents are entitled to impose on
peaceful intercourse between its citizens and their enemies, in particular,
limitations on the freedom of the seas").
73. John Astley III & Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of the Sea and Naval
Operations, 42 A.F. L. REv. 119, 139 (1997).
74. DINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 26 ("[T]he region of war does not include the
territories of neutral States, and no hostilities are permissible within neutral
boundaries.").
75. GC I, supra note 43, at art. 2.
76. Id. at art. 3.
77. See, e.g., Detlev F. Vagts, The Traditional Legal Concept of Neutrality in a
Changing Environment, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 83, 90 (1998) ("The traditional law

of neutrality takes hold in [internal conflicts] only in the event that the
contending force attains a level of power that causes other nations to recognize it
as a belligerent.").
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intrusion. As state and non-state actors
have often shifted unpredictably and irregularly between
acts characteristic of wartime and those characteristic of
not-wartime[, t]he unpredictable and irregular nature of
these shifts makes it difficult to know whether at any given
moment one should understand them as armies and their
enemies or as police forces and their criminal
78
adversaries.
Simply locating terrorist groups and operatives does not
therefore identify the parameters of the battlefield-the fact that
the United States and other states use a combination of military
operations and law enforcement measures to combat terrorism
blurs the lines one might look for in defining the battlefield. In
many situations, "the fight against transnational jihadi groups ...
largely takes place away from any recognizable battlefield."'9
Second, a look at U.S. jurisprudence in the past and today
demonstrates a clear break between the framework applied in past
wars and the views courts are taking today. U.S. courts during
World War I viewed "the port of New York [as] within the field of
Similarly, a 1942 decision
active [military] operations."so
upholding the lawfulness of an order evacuating JapaneseAmericans to a military area stated plainly that
the field of military operation is not confined to the scene
of actual physical combat. Our cities and transportation
systems, our coastline, our harbors, and even our
agricultural areas are all vitally important in the all-out
war effort in which our country must engage if our form
of government is to survive.
In each of those cases, the United States was a belligerent in an
international armed conflict; the law of neutrality mandated that
U.S. territory was belligerent territory and therefore part of the
battlefield or combat zone. The courts take a decidedly different
view in today's conflicts, however, consistently referring to the
United States as "outside a zone of combat,"" "distant from a zone

78. Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? Contemporay Conflict and the Legal
Construction of War, 43 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 7 (2004).
79. Monica Hakimi, International Standards for Detaining Terrorism Suspects:
Moving Beyond the Armed Conflict-CriminalDivide, 33 YALEJ. INT'L L. 369, 369 (2008).
80. United States ex rel. Wessels v. McDonald, 265 F. 754, 763 (E.D.N.Y. 1920).
81. Exparte Lincoln Seiichi Kanai, 46 F. Supp. 286, 288 (E.D. Wis. 1942).
82. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 698 (2d Cir. 2003).
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of combat, or not within any "active [or formal] theater of war,"
even while recognizing the novel geographic nature of the conflict.
Even more recently, in Al Maqaleh v. Gates, both the District Court
and the Court of Appeals distinguished between Afghanistan, "a
theater of active military combat,,15 and other areas (including the
United States), which are described as "far removed from any
battlefield.""6 In a traditional belligerency-neutrality framework,
one would expect to see U.S. territory viewed as part of the
battlefield; the fact that courts consistently trend the other way
highlights both the difference in approach and the uncertainty
involved in defining today's conflicts.
The current U.S. approach of using both the armed conflict
paradigm and the self-defense paradigm as justifications for
targeted strikes without further clarification serves to exacerbate
the legal challenges posed by the geography of the conflict, at both
a theoretical and a practical level. First, at the most fundamental
level, uncertainty regarding the parameters of the battlefield has
significant consequences for the safety and security of individuals.
During armed conflict, the LOAC authorizes the use of force as a
first resort against those identified as the enemy, whether
insurgents, terrorists or the armed forces of another state. In
contrast, human rights law, which would be the dominant legal
framework in areas where there is no armed conflict, authorizes the
use of force only as a last resort. 7 Apart from questions regarding
the application of human rights law during times of war, which are
outside the scope of this article, the distinction between the two
regimes is nonetheless starkest in this regard. The former permits
targeting of individuals based on their status as members of a
hostile force; the latter-human rights law-permits lethal force
against individuals only on the basis of their conduct posing a
83. Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1064 (2006) (GinsburgJ., dissenting).
84. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 770 (2008); see Al-Marri v. Wright, 487
F.3d 160, 196 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 38 (1942)).
85. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
86. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 220-21, 229 (D.D.C. 2009)
(emphasis added) (holding that certain individuals captured in Afghanistan and
detained at Bagram are not entitled to habeas corpus and specifically
distinguishing between detained battlefield enemy belligerents and individuals
apprehended outside the zone of combat operations).
87. See Geoffrey S. Corn, Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades: The Logical Limit of
Applying Human Rights Norms to Armed Conflict, 1 J. INT'L HUM. LEGAL STUD. 74, 74-

75 (2010), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id
=1511954.
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direct threat at that time. The LOAC also accepts the incidental
loss of civilian lives as collateral damage, within the bounds of the
88
principle of proportionality; human rights law contemplates no
such casualties. These contrasts can literally mean the difference
between life and death in many situations. Indeed, "If it is often
permissible to deliberately kill large numbers of humans in times of
armed conflict, even though such an act would be considered mass
murder in times of peace, then it is essential that politicians and
courts be able to distinguish readily between conflict and
nonconflict, between war and peace."" However, the overreliance
on flexibility at present means that U.S. officials do not distinguish
between conflict and non-conflict areas but rather simply use the
broad sweep of armed conflict and/or self-defense to cover all
areas without further delineation.
Second, on a broader level of legal application and
interpretation, the development of the law itself is affected by the
failure to delineate between relevant legal paradigms. "Emerging
technologies of potentially great geographic reach raise the issue of
what regime of law regulates these activities as they spread,"90 and
emphasize the need to foster, rather than hinder, development of
the law in these areas. Many argue that the ability to use armed
drones across state borders without risk to personnel who could be
shot down or captured across those borders has an expansive effect
on the location of conflict and hostilities. In effect, they suggest
that it is somehow "easier" to send unmanned aircraft across
sovereign borders because there is no risk of a pilot being shot
down and captured, making the escalation and spillover of conflict
Understanding the parameters of a conflict with
more likely.
terrorist groups is important, for a variety of reasons, none perhaps
more important than the life-and-death issues detailed above. By
the same measure, understanding the authorities for and limits on
a state's use of force in self-defense is essential to maintaining
orderly relations between states and to the ability of states to
defend against attacks, from whatever quarter. The extensive
debates in the academic and policy worlds highlight the

88. SeeAP I, supra note 43, at arts. 51(5) (b), 57(2) (a) (iii), 57(2) (b).
89. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and
the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 675, 702 (2004).
90. Anderson, supra note 42, at 2.
91. Mary Ellen O'Connell, Seductive Drones: Learning from a Decade of Lethal
Operations,J.L. INFO. & Sc. (forthcoming 2011).
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fundamental nature of both inquiries. However, the repeated
assurances from the U.S. government that targeted strikes are
lawful in the course of armed conflict or in exercise of the
legitimate right of self-defense-without further elaboration and
specificity-allows for a significantly less nuanced approach. As
long as a strike seems to fit into the overarching framework of
helping to defend the United States against terrorism, there no
longer would be a need to carefully delineate the parameters of
armed conflict and self-defense, where the outer boundaries of
each lie and how they differ from each other. From a purely
theoretical standpoint, this limits the development and
implementation of the law. Even from a more practical policy
standpoint, the United States may well find that the blurred lines
prove detrimental in the future when it seeks sharper delineations
for other purposes.
B.

Surrenderand Capture

In the immediate aftermath of the May 1, 2011 raid that killed
Osama bin Laden, one issue that dominated news stories and blogs
for several days was the question of whether the Navy Seals
executing the mission were obligated to attempt to capture bin
Laden before killing him and, as a subsidiary question, whether bin
Laden attempted to surrender before he was killed. This issue
highlights the distinction between the armed conflict and selfdefense regimes and the dangers of conflating them most directly.
Under the LOAC, an individual who is a legitimate target can
be targeted with deadly force as a first resort. Once an individual is
hors de combat, either through injury, sickness or capture, he or
she may not be attacked." Furthermore, the LOAC outlaws any

92. See, e.g., Michael Crowley, If bin Laden Was Unarmed, Why Was He Shot?,
TIME (May 3, 2011), http://swampland.time.com/2011/05/03/why-was-binladen-shot; Ken Dilanian and Brian Bennett, Osama bin Laden's Surrender Wasn't a
Likely Outcome in Raid, Officials Say, L.A. TIMEs (May 3, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/03/world/la-fg-bin-laden-us-20110504;
Stephanie Nebehay, U.N. Rights Investigators Seek Facts on bin Laden Death, REUTERS
(May 6, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/06/us-binladen-unexperts-idUSTRE74545Q20110506.
93. See AP I, supra note 43, at art. 41 ("1. A person who is recognized or who,
in the circumstances, should be recognized to be hors de combat shall not be made
the object of attack. 2. A person is hors de combat if: . . . (b) he clearly expresses an
intention to surrender.").
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denial of quarter.94 Indeed, killing or wounding an enemy fighter
who has laid down his arms and surrendered is a war crime under
Article 8(2) (b) (vi) of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court. 9 The prohibition on killing or harming detained
persons, whether prisoners of war or other detainees, does not
extend to an obligation to seek to capture before killing, however.
Rather, "combatants and civilians directly participating in the
hostilities must be hors de combat. .. before an obligation to capture
attaches."9 6 Thus, while combatants must not attack persons who
have surrendered (technically there is no obligation to actually
capture persons who surrender; the law prohibits attacking persons
who have surrendered), they have no obligation to offer
opportunities for surrender.97 As one scholar has explained,
[O]nce an armed conflict exists, it is not incumbent on
the army of the one party to inquire whether members of
a military unit of the other party wish to surrender before
attacking it. The onus is on the party that wishes to
surrender and thereby prevent attack to make this clear.'
At the heart of the matter, therefore, the legal issue centers on
a clear expression of the intent to surrender. 99 Surrender must be
94. AP I, supra note 43, at art. 40; Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, at art. 23(d), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. 539.
95. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998), at 95 (Art. 8(2)(b)(vi)), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/english/romestatute(e).pdf.
96. Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting Narcoinsurgents in Afghanistan: The Limits of
InternationalHumanitarian Law, 12 Y.B. INT'L HUMAN. L. 1, 14 (2009) (italics in
original); see Geoffrey S. Corn & Chris Jenks, Two Sides of the Combatant Coin:
UntanglingDirect Participationin Hostilitiesfrom Belligerent Status in Non-International
Armed Conflicts, 33 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 313, 343 (2011) (describing affirmative steps
members of armed belligerent groups must take to rebut the presumption that
they pose a threat by virtue of their belligerent status determination).
97. See JAN ROMER, KILLING IN A GRAY AREA BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN LAW AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: How CAN THE NATIONAL POLICE OF COLUMBIA OVERCOME THE
UNCERTAINTY OF WHICH BRANCH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO APPLY? 113-14 (2010);
David Glazier, Assessing the Legality of Osama bin Laden's Killing, MILLERhttp://www.miller-mccune.com/legal20,
2011),
(May
MCCUNE.COM
affairs/assessing-the-legality-of-osama-bin-ladens-killing-31441/.
98. Kretzmer, supra note 24, at 191; see also Marko Milanovic, When to Kill and
When to Capture?, EJIL: TALK (May 6, 2011), http://www.ejiltalk.org/when-to-killand-when-to-capture/ ("In other words, there is under IHL no obligation to first
employ non-lethal means against a lawful target, or to capture or detain before
trying to kill. Shooting first is perfectly proper.").
99. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 145 (2004) (noting that combatants need to
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accepted but need not be solicited. By all accounts, for example,
this appeared to be the rules of engagement for the bin Laden
raid. According to then-CIA director Leon Panetta's explanation,
The authority here was to kill bin Laden. And obviously,
under the rules of engagement, if he had in fact thrown
up his hands, surrendered and didn't appear to be
representing any kind of threat, then they were to capture
him. But they had full authority to kill him.'00
In contrast, human rights law's requirement that force only be
used as a last resort when absolutely necessary for the protection of
innocent victims of an attack creates an obligation to attempt to
capture a suspected terrorist before any lethal targeting."o A state
using force in self-defense against a terrorist cannot therefore
target him or her as a first resort but can only do so if there are no
alternatives-meaning that an offer of surrender or an attempt at
capture has been made or is entirely unfeasible in the
circumstances. Thus, if non-forceful measures can foil the terrorist
attack without the use of deadly force, then the state may not use
The supremacy of the right to life means
force in self-defense.
that "even the most dangerous individual must be captured, rather
than killed, so long as it is practically feasible to do so, bearing in
No more, this obligation to
mind all of the circumstances.
capture first rather than kill is not dependent on the target's efforts
to surrender; the obligation actually works the other way: the forces
manifest an intent to surrender in order to exempt themselves from being
targeted); Schmitt, supra note 54, at 42 ("The crucial issue is not whether the
individual in question can feasibly be captured but instead whether he or she has
clearly expressed his or her intention to surrender.").
100.

CIA Chief Panetta: Obama Made "Gutsy" Decision on Bin Laden Raid, PBS

NEWSHOUR (May 3, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism/janjunell/panetta_05-03.html.
101. ROMER, supra note 98, at 116; see also Schmitt, supra note 54, at 42 ("A
requirement does exist in human rights law to capture rather than kill when
possible. It applies primarily during peacetime as well as in certain circumstances
when occupying forces are acting to maintain order."); Major Shane Reeves and
Lt. Col. Jeremy Marsh, Bin Laden and Awlaki: Lawful Targets, HARV. INT'L REV., Oct.
26, 2011, availableat http://hir.harvard.edu/bin-laden-and-awlaki-lawful-targets
?page=0,0 (arguing that both bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki were lawfully
targeted within the context of an armed conflict, but noting that " [i]f al-Qaeda is a
transnational criminal organization, akin to the American-Sicilian mafia, then
domestic criminal law controls and capturing members is required save in extreme
cases of individual self-defense").
102. See McCann v. United Kingdom, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 97 (1995) (noting that
lethal force is disproportionate whenever non-lethal alternatives are available).
103. Milanovic, supranote 99, at 451.
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may not use deadly force except if absolutely necessary to protect
themselves or innocent persons from immediate danger, that is,
self-defense or defense of others. As with any law enforcement
104
operation, "the intended result. .. is the arrest of the suspect,",
and therefore every attempt must be made to capture before
resorting to lethal force.
In the abstract, the differences in the obligations regarding
surrender and capture seem straightforward. The use of both
armed conflict and self-defense justifications for all targeted strikes
without differentiation runs the risk of conflating the two very
different approaches to capture in the course of a targeting
operation. This conflation, in turn, is likely to either emasculate
human rights law's greater protections or undermine the LOAC's
greater permissiveness in the use of force, either of which is a
problematic result. An oft-cited example of the conflation of the
LOAC and human rights principles appears in the 2006 targeted
killings case before the Israeli Supreme Court. In analyzing the
lawfulness of the Israeli government's policy of "targeted
frustration," the Court held, inter alia, that
[a] civilian taking a direct part in hostilities cannot be
attacked at such time as he is doing so, if a less harmful
means can be employed.... Indeed, among the military
means, one must choose the means whose harm to the
human rights of the harmed person is smallest. Thus, if a
terrorist taking a direct part in hostilities can be arrested,
interrogated, and tried, those are the means which should
be employed. 105
The Israeli Supreme Court's finding that targeting is only
lawful if no less harmful means are available-even in the context
of an armed conflict-"impose [s] a requirement not based in [the
Indeed, the Israeli Supreme Court "used the kernel of
LOAC] .
104.

William Abresch, Book Review: Targeted Killing in InternationalLaw, 20 EUR.

J. INT'L L. 449, 451 (2009).
105. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov't of Israel 40
[2005] (Isr.). The court first held that (1) the conflict between Israel and the
relevant Palestinian armed groups is an international armed conflict; (2) terrorists
are not combatants but are civilians taking a direct part in hostilities; and (3) such
terrorists can be lawfully targeted during and for such time as they are taking a
direct part in hostilities.
106. Michael N. Schmitt, Targeted Killings and International Law: Law
Enforcement, Self-Defense, and Armed Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL HuMANITARIAN LAW
AND HU.MN RIGHTS LAW: TOWARDS A NEW MERGER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 525, 552
(2008).
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a human rights rule-that necessity must be shown for any
intentional deprivation of life, to restrict the application of [a
LOAC] rule-that in armed conflict no necessity need be shown
for the killing of combatants or civilians taking a direct part in
hostilities."' 7 Although the holding is specific to Israel and likely
influenced greatly by the added layer of belligerent occupation
relevant to the targeted strikes at issue in the case,los it
demonstrates some of the challenges of conflating the two
paradigms.
First, if this added obligation of less harmful means was
understood to form part of the law applicable to targeted strikes in
armed conflict, the result would be to disrupt the delicate balance
of military necessity and humanity and the equality of arms at the
heart of the LOAC. Civilians taking direct part in hostilities-who
are legitimate targets at least for the time they do so-would
suddenly merit a greater level of protection than persons who are
lawful combatants, a result not contemplated in the LOAC.'09
107.
Marko Milanovic, Norm Conflicts, International Humanitarian Law, and
Human Rights Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW,
COLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN LAW, Vol. XIX/1, at 30 (Orna

Ben-Naftali ed., 2010).
108. As the Court explained,
Arrest, investigation, and trial are not means which can always be used.
At times the possibility does not exist whatsoever; at times it involves a
risk so great to the lives of the soldiers, that it is not required. However,
it is a possibility which should always be considered. It might actually be
particularly practical under the conditions of belligerent occupation, in
which the army controls the area in which the operation takes place, and
in which arrest, investigation, and trial are at times realizable possibilities.
HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov't of Israel 40 [2005]
(Isr.); see also GURULt & CORN, supra note 52, at 86 (suggesting that the mixing of
the LOAC and law enforcement paradigms "may be explained by the unique
occupation relationship between the two parties to the conflict, a relationship that
implicitly implicates law enforcement type authorities and constraints. Or perhaps
the Court was tempering the effect of its broad interpretation of direct
participation in hostilities, attempting to ensure that individuals not actually
causing immediate harm to the [army] be subdued by less than lethal means when
feasible. Ultimately, that aspect of the opinion, like the international armed
conflict aspect, is arguably limited to the unique situation in the West Bank and
Gaza"). Note, however, that since the time this case was decided, Israel has
disengaged from the Gaza Strip, altering the nature of the legal regime applicable
to targeted strikes in that area.
109.
See Amichai Cohen & Yuval Shany, A Development of Modest Proportions: The
Application of the Principle of Proportionality in the Israeli Supreme Courtjudgment on the
Lawfulness of Targeted Killings 8 (Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem Research Paper No. 5-

07, 2007), available at www.ssrn.com/abstractid=979071 (noting that the Court's
"conclusion . . . appears to contradict [Justice] Barak's own statement that
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Second, soldiers faced with an obligation to always use less harmful
means may well either refrain from attacking the target-leaving
the innocent victims of the terrorist's planned attack
unprotected-or disregard the law as unrealistic and ineffective.
Neither option is appealing.
The former undermines the
protection of innocent civilians from unlawful attack, one of the
core purposes of the LOAC. The latter weakens respect for the
value and role of the LOAC altogether during conflict, a central
component of the protection of all persons in wartime.
From the opposing perspective, if the armed conflict rules for
capture and surrender were to bleed into the human rights and law
enforcement paradigm, the restrictions on the use of force in selfdefense would diminish. Persons suspected of terrorist attacks and
planning future terrorist attacks are entitled to the same set of
rights as other persons under human rights law and a relaxed set of
standards will only minimize and infringe on those rights.
Although there is no evidence that targeted strikes using drones
are being used in situations where there is an obligation to seek
capture and arrest, it is not hard to imagine a scenario in which the
combination of the extraordinary capabilities of drones and the
conflation of standards can lead to exactly that scenario. If states
begin to use lethal force as a first resort against individuals outside
of armed conflict, the established framework for the protection of
the right to life would begin to unravel. Not only would targeted
individuals suffer from reduced rights, but innocent individuals in
the vicinity would be subject to significantly greater risk of injury
and death as a consequence of the broadening use of force outside
of armed conflict.
C. Proportionalityin Three Acts
Proportionality is a term tossed around in a variety of ways and
settings with regard to the use of force, by states, by individuals,
against both individuals and objects. It is a central principle of the
'unlawful combatants' are 'subject to the risks of attack just like a combatant"');
Corn & Jenks, supra note 97, at 348 (stating the less harmful means approach "is
unsupported by any positive or customary LOAC obligation"); id. at 351 ("No
analogous protection [from being made the object of attack with deadly force in
the first resort] applies to lawful combatants, who by virtue of that status are
subject to such risk so long as they are capable of acting as agents of enemy
leadership.").
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LOAC, a key normative requirement framing the right to use force
in self-defense, and an essential factor limiting the use of force
Each
within law enforcement and human rights parameters.
concept of proportionality plays a central role in its own legal
regime; each has important protective purposes.
The primary issue in analyzing jus ad bellum proportionality is
whether the defensive use of force is appropriate in relation to the
ends sought, measuring the extent of the use of force against the
overall military goals, such as fending off an attack or
subordinating the enemy. This proportionality focuses not on
some measure of symmetry between the original attack and the use
of force in response, but on whether the measure of counter-force
used is proportionate to the needs and goals of repelling or deterring
the original attack."o As a report to the International Law
Commission explains,
[I] t would be mistaken ... to think that there must be
proportionality between the conduct constituting the
armed attack and the opposing conduct. The action
needed to halt and repulse the attack may well have to
assume dimensions disproportionate to those of the attack
suffered. What matters in this respect is the result to be
achieved by the 'defensive' action, and not the forms,
substance and strength of the action itself.
In both Nicaragua v. United States and Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo, the International Court of Justice reaffirmed

that proportionality focuses on the degree of force needed to
The Court declared in
eliminate the danger or repel the attack.
the latter case that the Ugandan operations capturing "airports and
towns many hundreds of kilometres from Uganda's border would
110. DINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 225; see also Michael N. Schmitt, 'Change
Direction' 2006: Israeli Operations in Lebanon and the International Law of SelfDefense,

29 MICH. J. INT'L L. 127 (2008) (discussing Israel's use of force in response to
Hezbollah attacks).

111.
Roberto Ago, Addendum - Eighth Report on State Responsibility: The
Internationally Wrongful Act of the State, Source of InternationalResponsibility, [1980] 2

Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 13, 69, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318/ADD.5-7.
112. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June
27), at 112; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168 (Dec. 19), 1 147; see alsojUDITH GAIL GARDAM, NECESSITY,
PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 158 (2004) (explaining that in
the Nicaraguacase, the Court held that "the approach is not to focus on the nature
of the attack itself and ask what is a proportionate response but rather to
determine what is proportionate to achieving the legitimate goal under the
Charter, the repulsion of the attack").
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not seem proportionate to the series of transborder attacks it
claimed had given rise to the right of self-defence."1
Thus, a
violation of jus ad bellum proportionality only occurs when "the
defender [does] more than reasonably required in the
circumstances to deter a threatened attack or defeat an ongoing
one. ,,114
The LOAC principle of proportionality requires that parties
refrain from attacks in which the expected civilian casualties will be
excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage gained.
Proportionality in the LOAC is a prospective analysis, viewed from
the perspective of the commander at the time of the attack. Merely
adding up the resulting civilian casualties and injuries and assessing
the actual value gained from a military operation may be the
simpler approach, because "the results of an attack are often
tangible and measurable, whereas expectations are not."1
However, it does not do justice to the complexities inherent in
combat; instead, the proportionality of any attack must be viewed
from the perspective of the military commander on the ground,
taking into account the information he or she had at the time. As
the ICTY declared in Prosecutor v. Galic, for example, "In
determining whether an attack was proportionate it is necessary to
examine whether a reasonably well-informed person in the
circumstances of the actual perpetrator, making reasonable use of
the information available to him or her, could have expected
excessive civilian casualties to result from the attack.""'
Finally, proportionality in human rights law refers to the
measure of force directed at the intended target of the attack. Law
enforcement authorities can use no more force than is absolutely
necessary to effectuate an arrest, defend themselves, or defend
others from attack. "In the domestic context, the force used must
be strictly proportionate to the aim to be achieved.""
United
113. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168 (Dec. 19), 1147.
114. Schmitt,. supra note 111, at 154 (emphasizing that assessments of the
Israeli response to Hezbollah rocket attacks must be on the basis of the force
needed to end the attacks, not on the relation between the attacks and the force
used).
115. Schmitt, supra note 62, at 294.
116. Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T,Judgment, 58 (Dec. 5,
2003).
117. Kenneth M. Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights
Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 32-33 (2004) (citing

McCann v. United Kingdom, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 97, 160-61, para. 149 (1995)).
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Nations General Assembly Resolution 34/169 adopted a Code of
Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, which states that "[1]aw
enforcement officials may use force only when strictly necessary
and to the extent required for the performance of their duty."
The commentary to that provision states that the principle of
proportionality restricts the use of force by such officials. In
particular, in human rights law and law enforcement, "the
principle of proportionality operates to protect the object of state
violence by allowing only that amount of force necessary to subdue
a hostile actor.""8
These three forms of proportionality differ substantially from
each other. "[P]roportionality in law enforcement is a strikingly
different concept from its meaning and function under the law of
armed conflict."',o The former focuses on the object of state
violence-the target of the deadly force-while the latter focuses
on the unintended victims of the use of force, which is directed at
In addition, jus ad bellum
legitimate targets of attack.
proportionality is unconcerned with the extent of civilian casualties
and instead focuses on the extent of the force a state uses to
counter or deter an attack or threat of attack. Each serves a key
purpose in international law, but when they become conflated or
the lines between them become blurred, their force will be
diminished.
When the U.S. continually offers both armed conflict and selfdefense as the justification for targeted strikes, the result is that one
or more of these different forms of proportionality may be applied
when it is not relevant or, perhaps more troubling, will not be
applied when it should. Imagine, for example, a scenario in which
the United States targets an individual in what should be a selfdefense-i.e., outside of armed conflict-situation but that
distinction is lost because of the general use of both justifications in
all situations. That scenario is one in which the force used must be
absolutely necessary and proportional to the need to deter the
terrorist's planned attack. And yet, because no differentiation is
made between that situation and another that rightly falls within an
armed conflict paradigm, the focus of policy and academic
118. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, G.A. Res. 34/169, art. 3
(Dec. 17, 1979).
119. GURULE & CORN, supranote 52, at 80.
120. Dale Stephens, Military Involvement in Law Enforcement, 92 INr'L REV. RED
CROss 453, 462 (2010).
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discourse is on whether the attack comported with the LOAC
principle of proportionality-that is, whether the incidental civilian
casualties from the attack were excessive. Two sets of rights lose
protection in this scenario: the right of the individual being
targeted to not be targeted with deadly force as a first resort, and
the right of those persons who fall within the category of
"incidental casualties," whose death is not a violation of the LOAC
but would likely be a violation of human rights law. 121
In the opposite scenario, soldiers fighting in an armed conflict
would no longer be able to use lethal force as a first resort absent a
showing of individualized threat and necessity in every case, a
situation in which the LOAC's acceptance of targeting on the basis
of status (for certain categories of persons) would be eliminated.
On first glance, such a development seems more protective of
rights, without a doubt. However, it undoes the inherent delicate
balance between military necessity and humanity that lies at the
heart of the LOAC, likely trending too far in the direction of the
latter. "There is no treaty language regarding 'proportionate force'
applied against military units or other military objectives, and State
practice historically has emphasized *application of 'overwhelming
force' against enemy forces."
More important, "Conflating these
disparate principles into a singular regulatory norm substantially
degrades the scope of lawful targeting authority and confuses those
charged with executing combat operations."12 In addition, when
121. Although "the justification of so-called collateral damage ... is not illegal
per se under international human rights law, [it] would be far more difficult than
it is under IHL." Robin Gei8 & Michael Siegrist, Has the Armed Conflict in
Afghanistan Affected the Rules on the Conduct of Hostilities?,93 INT'L REV. OF THE RED
CROSS 11, 24 n.69 (2011).
122. W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC 'Direct Participationin Hostilities'Study: No
Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 J. INT'L L. POL. 769, 806-07 n.103
(2010); see id. at 815 (noting that the use of a law enforcement paradigm subjects
wartime military operations to an unrealistic "use-of-force continuum . . .
beginning with the least-injurious action before resorting to 'grave injury' in attack
of an enemy combatant or a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities"). In
addition, the application of human rights law as a governing paradigm for armed
conflict "is still widely perceived as battlefield-inadequate, risky to implement, and
therefore unrealistic." GeiB & Siegrist, supra note 122, at 25; see also Corn &Jenks,
supra note 97, at 347 ("[I]t is common practice to use overwhelming force against.
. . enemy objectives in order to influence the subsequent behavior of enemy
leadership and other enemy forces.").
123. Corn, supra note 11, at 16, 20 ("Collectively, all of these considerations
indicate that extending jus ad bellum proportionality to jus in bello decision-making
produces at worst a significant distortion of legitimate operational authority, and
at best confusion as to the scope of targeting authority. Are forces executing jus ad
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soldiers can no longer use force in a manner appropriate to fulfill
their mission to defend against and defeat the relevant threat, the
state fails to protect its own citizens from ongoing or future attacks.
D. Imminent Threat, Status, and Direct Participationin Hostilities
One final area in which the dual use of the armed conflict and
self-defense justifications raises concerns is in the identification of
targets. As noted above, legitimate targets within an armed conflict
include combatants, members of organized armed groups, and
civilians directly participating in hostilities. 24 Notably, targeting
authority in the LOAC "in no way requires manifestation of actual
threat to the attacking force. ,"12 Outside of armed conflict, persons
targeted must pose an imminent threat. The existence of an
obligation to capture or use non-forceful means as a first resort is,
of course, a significant difference between the two regimes, as the
two previous subsections discuss. Beyond the conduct of hostilities
against an identified target, however, the precise contours of who is
a legitimate target differ between the two regimes.
First, one large category of persons who can be targeted within
an armed conflict-even an armed conflict against terrorist
groups-is the category of persons who can be targeted on the
That is, individuals who are combatants (in
basis of their status.
an international armed conflict) or fighters for an organized armed
group (in either international or non-international armed conflict)
are liable to attack at all times. It does not matter if they pose a
threat or are asleep at the time of the attack; they are legitimate
targets at all times.m Some individuals who are members of a
bellum self-defense missions obligated to employ minimum force to subdue the
object of attack? Is the object of attack protected by the principle? Must
proportionality be assessed based on an exclusive consideration of reducing the
threat presented by the immediate object of attack, or may the broader impact on
enemy forces be considered? These questions are nullified by maintaining the
traditional division between jus ad bellum authority and jus in bello regulation.").
124. See supraPart I.
125. Corn, supra note 11, at 15.
126. Corn & jenks, supra note 97, at 341 ("All battlefield targeting authority
falls into two broad categories: status and conduct based. Status based targeting
authority is . . . triggered by the determination that a proposed object of attack is a
member of an opposition belligerent force. In contrast, conduct based targeting
is based on the determination that an individual presumed inoffensive is engaged
in conduct hostile to the friendly force.").
127. GARY SoLs, THE LAw OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAw IN WAR 188 (2010) ("A combatant remains a combatant when he/she is not

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012

39

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 5 [2012], Art. 11

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

1694

[Vol.38:5

terrorist group engaged in an armed conflict with a state may well
qualify as legitimate targets at all times because of their status as
operational leaders or otherwise "full-time" fighters for the group.
In this way, Osama bin Laden was a lawful target of attack at all
times as the leader of al Qaeda, even though he was not likely
engaged in any hostilities at the time of the raid that killed him in
Pakistan on May 1, 2011. This status-based targeting authority is a
central feature of the LOAC-membership in the enemy forces
makes one a presumptive hostile threat at all times.
In contrast, an individual targeted with lethal force outside of
armed conflict, by a state acting in self-defense, can only be
targeted on the grounds that he or she poses an imminent threat
by dint of involvement in ongoing or future attacks. The law of
self-defense does not include any concept of targeting on the basis
of status; it is solely conduct-based and threat-based. As an
example, one definition of a legitimate target within the framework
of self-defense through operational counterterrorism is: "An
individual who, according to intelligence information ... intends
in the future to either commit or facilitate an act of terrorism that
endangers national security."
Like other conceptions of lawful
targets of attack within the framework of self-defense, this
definition focuses on individualized threat determinations,
imminence, and necessity, and does not include any reference to
membership, status, or function. The solely conduct-based nature
of targeting in self-defense situations is central to the need for strict
parameters based on necessity and imminence in order to
maximize protection for both innocent persons and suspected
terrorists who may be the target of attack. The more generalized
status-based targeting used in armed conflict (for persons who
rightly fall within designated categories) simply cannot-and need
not, given the circumstances and nature of armed conflict-meet
these more exacting standards.
When no differentiation is made between the armed conflict
and self-defense justifications and the two paradigms are potentially
conflated, serious concerns regarding the legal parameters for
targeting may arise. The greatest risk is that the status-based
targeting regime relevant to armed conflict could bleed over into
self-defense targeting. Suddenly, imminence and individualized
actually fighting.").
128.

Amos N. Guiora, Determininga Legitimate Target: The Dilemma of the Decision

Maker, 47 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 13 (2011) (italics omitted).
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threat determinations begin to give way to more amorphous and
seemingly simplistic designations of membership and affiliation or
association. In fact, even beyond that danger, one might argue that
it is easier to group more groups or individuals within the category
of "enemy" because of the greater ease in reaching them with the
The use of
superior capability and decreased riskiness of drones.
so-called "signature strikes"'" outside of Afghanistan and
Pakistan-the "hot battlefields"-surely raises the prospect of
status-based targeting in areas where the existence of an armed
conflict is uncertain. The category of persons who can be targeted
outside of armed conflict thus becomes significantly broader than
that contemplated by international law and that normally
demonstrated through state practice in situations in which selfdefense is not conflated with armed conflict.
The risks of non-differentiation extend beyond the distinction
between status-based and conduct- or threat-based targeting,
however. Another category of legitimate targets within armed
conflict consists of civilians who are directly participating in
hostilities. Such persons are targetable during and for such time as
they are directly participating in hostilities. 3 ' The notion of direct
participation in hostilities is much closer in concept to imminent
threat as a standard for targeting in self-defense. Here, however,
the risk lies in the other direction, in the effect of conflation on the
armed conflict targeting framework. Notwithstanding continued
debate over the particular precise definition of direct participation
in hostilities and the meaning of the various components of such a
definition,
one aspect of the definition is certain-the acts in
129. See, e.g., Robert Chesney, Is AQAP Part-and-Parcelof al Qaeda? Some New
Evidence, LAWFAREBLOG.COM (Aug. 28, 2011 2:56 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com

/2011/08/is-aqap-part-and-parcel-of-al-qaeda-some-new-evidence/.
130. Adam Entous et al., U.S. Tightens Drone Rules, WALL Sr. J., Nov. 4, 2011, at
Al ("Signature strikes target groups of men believed to be militants associated
with terrorist groups, but whose identities aren't always known. The bulk of CIA's
drone strikes are signature strikes."), available at http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424052970204621904577013982672973836.html.
131. AP 1, supra note 43, at art. 51(3). The only judicial decision as of yet on
targeted killing is the 2005 Israeli targeted killings case that analyzed the direct
participation in the context of targeting terrorists within the framework of an
armed conflict. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov't of
Israel [2005] (Isr.).
132. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) embarked on a
five-year process of expert meetings and consultation to define direct participation
in hostilities. The end result, The ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct
See Interpretive
Participation in Hostilities, was published in December 2008.
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which an individual is engaged must have some link to an ongoing
armed conflict.' Thus, "To rise to the level of direct participation,
an act must also be related to the conflict."1 14 As the ICRC's
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participationin Hostilities
states, an "act must be specifically designed to directly cause the
required threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and
to the detriment of another . . . .

Therefore, ordinary crime,

which remains common and often more prevalent during armed
conflict, would not qualify as direct participation, even if it involved
the use of firearms or other violent means.'3 In Afghanistan, for
example, mere involvement in drug activities, without more, would
not be sufficient to label someone as a direct participant in
hostilities.
In contrast, targeting in the context of self-defense inherently
does not involve a link to armed conflict because it takes place
outside of an armed conflict from the start. Although the overall
parameters for targeting in self-defense must, by nature, be stricter
than those for targeting in armed conflict (i.e., no status-based
targeting), there is no requirement for a belligerent nexus because
such a factor simply would not make sense. Instead, the narrow
Guidance, supra note 52. However, the meaning of direct participation remains
contested and subject to further controversy and analysis. Many of the experts
who participated in the process have taken issue with a number of the definitional
elements and factors presented in the ICRC publication. See, e.g., Bill Boothby,
"And For Such Time As": The Time Dimension to Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 741 (2010); Parks, supra note 123; Michael N. Schmitt,
DeconstructingDirect Participationin Hostilities: The ConstitutiveElements, 42 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 697 (2010); Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed
Groups and the ICRC "DirectParticipationin Hostilities"Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & PoL. 641 (2010).
133. "All the experts [in the ICRC process] agreed, for instance, that mere
criminal activity which takes advantage of the instability typically incident to
hostilities does not meet the third constitutive element, belligerent nexus."
Schmitt, supra note 97, at 17. Although disputes remain regarding the exact
nature of the belligerent nexus, some link to aned conflict is essential to the
notion of direct participation in hostilities.
134. Id.
135. Interpretive Guidance, supra note 52, at 27.
136. See Beth Van Schaack, The Killing of Osama Bin Laden & Anwar al-Awlaki:
The Journey to Legality Through Uncharted Territoy, 14 Y.B. INT'L HUM. L.
(forthcoming 2011) ("[T]he existence of an armed conflict does not mean that
every law enforcement exercise is governed by IHL; a nexus to the conflict is
required." (citing Robin GeiB, Armed Violence in Fragile States: Low-Intensity Conflicts,
Spillover Conflicts, and Sporadic Law Enforcement Operations by Third Parties, 91 INT'L
REv. RED CROss 127, 139 (2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files
/other/irrc-873-geiss.pdf)).
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strictures for imminence and necessity operate to protect against
an undue broadening of the class of legitimate targets. The risk,
therefore, is that the lack of nexus requirement in self-defense will
transfer over to the armed conflict paradigm, leading to a
weakening or elimination of the belligerent nexus requirement for
Allowing targeting-with lethal
targeting in armed conflict.
force-of persons who engage in violence regardless of whether
they have any link to the conflict significantly diminishes the
protective purposes of both the LOAC and human rights law
during armed conflict and results in many more people being
caught up in the dangers of conflict.
IV. CONSEQUENCES AND CONCERNS

Using both the armed conflict and self-defense justifications
for all targeted strikes, whether in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, or
elsewhere, may be an easy way to communicate to the public that
the state is using force to eliminate "bad guys." It certainly adds a
great degree of flexibility to policy-making and decision-making,
which is highly valuable from the perspective of political leaders.
The costs of allowing the lines between legal regimes and
paradigms to become blurred, however, are far too great.
A. Fulfillment of the CorePurposes of the Law
One core purpose of the LOAC is the protection of innocent
civilians by minimizing harm to civilians and civilian objects during
wartime. Another is to enable effective military operations within
the boundaries of the law. A central purpose of human rights law is
the protection of individuals from violation of their rights and
overreaching, even-and especially-during times of national
emergency. Blurring the lines between armed conflict and selfdefense and the targeting authority relevant to each legal regime
directly affects all three of these critical goals. First, the hard-todefine parameters of an ongoing armed conflict with terrorist
groups raise serious concerns about too many areas being
subsumed within an area of armed conflict and the use of lethal
force as a first resort. As more and more areas are viewed as part of
the "zone of combat," more innocent civilians will face the
consequences of hostilities, whether unintended death, injury, or
property damage. This result runs counter to both the LOAC and
human rights law. The potential spillover between status-based
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targeting and direct participation in the armed conflict framework
and imminence and necessity (but without belligerent nexus) in
the self-defense framework provoke similar consternation with
regard to the protective and discriminating purposes of both
bodies of law.
At the same time, the blending of proportionalities and rules
regarding obligations to capture, rather than kill, risk importing
too much of the law enforcement and human rights paradigm into
the battlefield. Imagine the consequences for units on patrol if,
after coming upon recognized hostile enemy forces, they were
required to wait for those forces to fire first before opening fire.
Mission accomplishment would become significantly more difficult
and force protection considerations could reach a problematic
level.
The ability to deliberately attack enemy belligerents with
the full force of combat power available for mission
accomplishment-an authority that implicitly allows the
use of deadly force as a measure of first resort-is an
essential aspect of armed hostilities between organized
belligerent groups. Indeed, the ability to mass the effects
of combat power at the decisive place and time often
contributes to accelerating enemy capitulation, thereby
sparing many enemy belligerents who might otherwise be
subject to a loss of life even if a minimum necessary force
obligation were applied.'
Such developments simply do not comport with the basic tenet
of the LOAC that a belligerent has the right to use any and all
measures necessary to bring about the complete submission of the
enemy as soon as possible and which are not forbidden by the laws
1381
of war.
B.

Development and Implementation of the Law GoingForward

Blurring the lines between legal paradigms has longer-term
consequences as well for the development and implementation of
the law in the future. For example, one fundamental aspect of the
LOAC is how it defines categories of individuals. 39 How the law
137.

Corn &Jenks, supra note 97, at 355.

See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE FIELD
MANUAL 27-10, 3-4 (1956).

138.

139. Fionnuala Ni AohAin, The No-Gaps Approach to ParallelApplication in the
Context of the War on Terror, 40 IsR. L. REv. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 563, 585 (2007)

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss5/11

44

Blank: Targeted Strikes: The Consequences of Blurring the Armed Conflict

2012]

TARGETED STRIKES

1699

categorizes persons within an armed conflict is critical to the
protections and rights such persons enjoy, giving this definitional
aspect of the law great reach. Revisiting the substantive debate
about whether suspected terrorist operatives are criminals or
belligerents (whether entitled to prisoner of war status or not) is
However, it is particularly
beyond the scope of this article.
interesting to note that in the course of nearly ten years of debate,
conversation, legislation, and judicial opinions attempting to create
and set the parameters of the category of enemy combatant, nearly
all of that debate has focused on which legal paradigm to apply, not
on the fact that these are individuals with basic rights. As the legal
paradigms are now blurred-at least with regard to targeting-with
the continual use of both paradigms to justify all strikes, further
careful development and delineation between the armed conflict
and self-defense framework will unfortunately remain stalled and
pragmatic concerns about basic rights lost in the shuffle.
Beyond these ground-level concerns, the conflation of legal
regimes also creates numerous missed opportunities to explore and
engage the complex issues that arise on the hard-to-identify lines
between armed conflict and self-defense. The past year or two has
brought growing discussion about the geographic parameters of an
armed conflict between a state and terrorist groups, from the
question of whether any such parameters do exist to the follow-on
questions of what those boundaries might be and from where to
This discussion is
draw guiding principles for such analysis.14
important not just for the sake of finding "answers" to these hard
questions but-perhaps more-for the purpose of understanding
the key issues and principles inherent in the analysis and the
competing rights and values at stake. The LOAC has traditionally
balanced a variety of interests, such as military necessity and
humanity, and has developed over the years in response to the
needs and changes of those in combat and those suffering from the
deliberate and incidental effects of combat. Failure to engage
directly with the tough issues that lie at the heart of the distinction
("[D]eployment of the term [war] is not without legal significance in so far as it
seeks to reshape legal categorizations and suggests that the hegemonic state has
the implicit power to re-make legal categorizations by virtue of their 'naming it
so.",).
140. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 42; Louise Arimatsu, Teoritmy, Boundaries
and the Law of Arned Conflict, 12 Y.B. Int'l Humanitarian L. 157 (2009); Blank,

supra note 68 (discussing the struggle to define a zone of combat in modern
combat); O'Connell, supranote 7.
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between where a state is acting as part of an armed conflict and
where it is acting solely in legitimate self-defense against a terrorist
or other threat is, ultimately, a wasted opportunity to promote
greater development in the law going forward. Non-answers to
hard questions may be easy, but they are rarely productive in the
end.
C. Enforcement Through Both Formal and Informal Means
Finally, effective implementation of and compliance with the
law, whether the LOAC, the law of self-defense, or human rights
law, depends on regular and respected mechanisms for
enforcement. In the arena of international law, both formal
(courts and tribunals) and informal (public opinion, response
from other states) enforcement have value and effect. Any judicial
body determining the lawfulness of state action or the criminal
responsibility of individuals must first determine the applicable law
in order to reach an appropriate result." When the legal regimes
become blurred through repeated conflation, application of the
law and thus enforcement will be hampered. The resulting
consequence, of course, is that a lack of effective enforcement then
undermines effective implementation of the law and protection of
persons in the future. These problems often are highlighted in the
more informal enforcement arena of media reporting, public
opinion, advocacy reports, and other responses, where disputes
over applicable law and appropriate analyses abound. When
international or nongovernmental organization reports produce
primarily disputes over which law is applied-rather than how the
law is applied to the facts on the ground-the debate becomes
centered on the law and legal disputes rather than on the victims,
the perpetrators, and how to prevent legal violations in the future.
The blurring of lines between armed conflict and self-defense takes
these challenges to another level as well, however, creating a
situation in which independent analysts may have difficulty
identifying the key pieces of information necessary to an effective
examination of the legality of the state's policies and actions.
141. For example, in Abella v. Argentina, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights first assessed whether there was an armed conflict that triggered
the application of the law of armed conflict in order to then determine how to
analyze the actions of the Argentine military and government and the rights of the
petitioners. See Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
177-78 (1997).
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